For the United States to maintain her current position in the global order and successfully achieve her national interests in the twenty-first century, the nation must understand clearly the character of modern war and reorganize the national security structure at the regional level accordingly to integrate all instruments of national power, improve whole of government unity of effort and execute comprehensive strategies with precision. The world is a much different place than it was just 60 years ago. The notion that today's strategic environment is significantly more complex than that of the past stems from a lack of appreciation for the character of twenty-first century warfare, underscored by awkward attempts to pursue national interests through a national security organization that was established more than six decades ago. The character of war has changed. It is time for the United States government to change accordingly.
America Needs a National Security Act for the Twenty-First Century
As United States Naval War College professor Dr. Milan Vego observed, "All wars consist of features that are unchangeable or constant regardless of the era in which they are fought and those that are transitory or specific to a certain era."
1 Marine
Lt Gen Paul Van Riper echoed this idea in an interview following his controversial employment of the opposing force during the joint integrating event Millennium
Challenge 2002. "In reality, the fundamental nature of war hasn't changed, won't change, and, in fact, can't change." 2 "What is changing -in fact, is always changing -is the character and form of war…" 3 Several attributes of today's strategic environment combine to create a distinct character of twenty-first century warfare. For the past two decades, the United States military has struggled to understand the character of modern war. This lack of understanding manifests itself in the overuse of acronyms such as VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous) to describe the strategic environment. In the 1800s, classic war theorist Carl von Clausewitz used very similar terms to describe the enduring nature of war. The modern battlefield is not more complex than those of previous eras. The complexity of today is simply different than the past. If one accepts that the environment is too volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous to comprehend, there is little utility in trying to do so. Hence, the military often looks to technology to define the character of war in this era. Focusing on technology led the United States to a capabilities-based approach to organizing and equipping. Such an approach ignores the true character of contemporary warfare and instead, is based on how the United States prefers to fight. 4 The conduct of Millennium
Challenge 2002, although largely ignored, revealed the risks inherent in a capabilitiesbased approach; most notably, the enemy may prefer not to behave as the United 2 States desires. That is not to suggest that the United States should abandon her focus on technology. In fact, the United States military's overwhelming technological advantage has often enabled it to prevail despite flawed strategy. Still, as the government enters a period of prolonged fiscal austerity, the nation will require efficiency as well as effectiveness in the application of national power.
As Clausewitz stated, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature." 5 To that end, this paper describes the character of twenty-first century war by focusing on five defining and interrelated factors that affect ends, ways, and means: (1) limited political objectives, (2) rising power of non-state actors, (3) proliferation of information and communication technology, (4) 24-hour news media, and (5) United States domestic politics. Combined, these five factors expose seams in the national security organizational structure and frustrate traditional military planning paradigms. For the United States to maintain her current position in the global order and successfully achieve her national interests in the twenty-first century, the nation must understand clearly the character of modern war and reorganize the national security structure at the regional level accordingly to integrate all instruments of national power, improve whole of government unity of effort and execute comprehensive strategies with precision.
Limited Political Objectives
War, whether total or limited, is simply a means to achieve a political objective.
Clausewitz described war as, "…not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means." 6 He 3 further stated that, "The political objective is the goal, war is a means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." 7 The dictionary defines limited war as, "war conducted with less than a nation's total resources and restricted in aim to less than total defeat of the enemy." 8 Notice that the definition does not suggest that limited war is less deadly than total war. The United States and her allies have lost hundreds of thousands of lives in limited wars. 9 The salient point from the definition is that limited political objectives inherently limit the ways and means to attaining those 17 The number and diversity of these organizations increases each year. 18 Because the obstacles to their participation in international political discourse are diminished, 19 the influence and reach of non-state actors has grown to unprecedented levels. 20 Non-state actors are capable of setting international and domestic political agendas, negotiating diplomatic outcomes, and implementing solutions to international problems. 21 While the interests and objectives of these groups are diverse, they all have one thing in common. They are all stakeholders in international politics. Their rise in power alters the strategic environment and lessens the power of the traditional nationstate.
The most prominent international governmental organization is the United Nations, established in 1945, "to prevent war, protect human rights, maintain international law, and promote social progress." 22 The United Nations was created on a foundation of the Peace of Westphalia as an international governing body with the power to contain nation-states from coercive and aggressive behavior. The United
States played a significant role in the creation of the United Nations, even hosting the organization on her own soil. In the earlier years of its existence, mostly because of the bipolar nature of the Cold War era, the United Nations exerted little power, particularly in matters of United States' national interests. Since the Berlin Wall fell, however, the United Nations' power has steadily grown in scope and influence. As a point of reference, the United Nations Security Council passed 644 resolutions in its first 45 years of existence before the end of the Cold War. In the 22 years that followed, the same council passed 1,441 resolutions. 23 Additionally, the United Nations is increasingly Information is a key power resource historically controlled by the nation-state, but the ability to communicate and access information from anywhere at any time is quickly becoming universal. Beyond access, cellular telephones equipped with camera and video capabilities create an ability to produce information in real-time and rapidly disseminate it globally. Seventy percent of all information generated annually is produced by citizens through e-mail, Internet blogs, and video postings on the worldwide web. 35 Moreover, governments struggle to control the content and distribution of the information. 36 Essentially, the worldwide web is an ungoverned domain that transcends national boundaries. An impact of the proliferation of information is a dissipation of polarity in world order, thereby diffusing the power of the world's strongest nations. 37 As the power of nation-states diffuses, the power of non-state actors increases.
In the information age, non-state actors possess real, tangible, and inexpensive instruments of power. 
24-Hour News Media
While news media has influenced public opinion and domestic politics for centuries, the industry has evolved considerably over the past 20 years. Three nightly network news programs and daily newspapers gave way to continuous media broadcasts on scores of cable news networks, thousands of journalistic websites, and smart phone applications that instantly push headlines to citizens as news occurs.
These tremendous increases in frequency and medium of delivery have been accompanied by a corresponding increase in competition between media outlets that now prioritize speed of delivery above accuracy. The result is that political and military leaders of the twenty-first century operate in a transparent environment. 42 Media sets and prioritizes the political agenda, establishes the tone for each issue and controls the volume of the debate. 43 Journalists and media outlets set the agenda by deciding which issues to call to the public's attention and which issues to ignore. 44 They choose the lead broadcast stories, headlines above the fold in the daily newspaper and the events pushed to citizens via smart phone applications. Media sets the tone, positive or negative, simply by the headline they attach to the issue. 45 The following is the headline , domestic issues tend to receive greater priority than limited war objectives. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had no genuine impact on domestic life in the United States. 53 Two Presidential administrations, one Republican and one Democrat, decided not to raise taxes to avoid burdening the American population with even the costs of the wars. 54 The increasingly partisan nature of politics in America, fueled by rapid national election cycles and associated political campaigning prohibits comprehensive strategy formulation. American politics are more parochial today than ever in our nation's history. 55 Political parties, lobby groups, and nongovernmental organizations use the media as a battleground in the fight for positive 14 public opinion. Often, partisan political debate results in a compromise to the lowest common denominator, certainly not a recipe for winning the nation's wars.
The other key component of the domestic political landscape is the American people. As Bernard Brodie observed, "The capacity of the American public is likely to be precarious, and certainly not to be counted upon if that war is prolonged." 56 The
American public has a long history of intolerance for extended wars, particularly limited wars. Many scholars, national security analysts, and even United States' enemies contend that this intolerance stems from an American public aversion to casualties. 57 Essentially, the theory is that the American public will tolerate a certain number of casualties, after which, public support for the war effort will erode. Other scholars, further postulate that the number of casualties the public is willing to accept is directly proportional to the value of the national interest at stake. 58 These scholars view Somalia and Vietnam as wars conducted for marginal national interests, and therefore, public tolerance for casualties was low. Conversely, World War II and Afghanistan represented survival interests for the United States, making the American public's tolerance much higher. Still another school of thought, and one that ultimately may be more accurate, is that the American public's tolerance level for casualties is proportional to the perceived probability of the United States winning the war effort. 59 In other words, the American people are not casualty averse; they are averse to losing. While public support did wane with regard to Korea and Vietnam as casualties grew, levels of public support aligned more closely with perceptions of winning and losing. 60 Public support for the war in Iraq followed a similar pattern. 61 In the total wars the United States has fought, while few in number, the military pursued clear political objectives with few, in any, limitations on the ways and means available to achieve those objectives, and the result was always victory. In this era of transparency, political objectives in limited wars are most often vague, and many prove elusive to the use of military power. Domestic agendas, partisan politics, and a variety of non-state actors directly and indirectly impose limitations on the ways and means available to achieve those elusive objectives. Under these contemporary conditions, military campaigns often protract, and the perceived probability of winning varies over time, creating imbalance between the people, the government, and the military. As Sun Tzu warned centuries ago, "For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited." 62 The United States is no exception.
Limited political objectives, rising power of non-state actors, proliferation of information and communications technology, 24-hour news media, and United States domestic politics combine to create a unique character of twenty-first century war that differs greatly in complexity from previous eras. As Clausewitz succinctly stated, "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." 63 In the contemporary security environment, compelling the enemy to do our will must be accomplished in the midst of a transparent, sophisticated, interconnected system of state and non-state actors, each with their own interests and objectives. Seminal international relations theorist Hans J.
Morgenthau stated, "Political power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised." 64 In the twenty-first century, political power is diffused amongst numerous actors. While the United States possess the greatest military power in the world, in a war for limited objectives, that military power is restrained and the restraints inhibit effective translation of policy into military strategy.
More often than not, the result is a protracted war in which public support parallels media assessments of whether the United States is winning or losing. Seldom does the United States fully achieve her national interests at costs commensurate to the value of those interests.
Given All Geographic Combatant Commands recognize the absolute necessity of a whole of government approach and have made significant efforts over the past decades to affect such an approach. 67 They have all established some form of a Joint
Interagency Coordination Group. These groups have evolved and improved since their creation in 2001, but they are still insufficient to meet the demands of the contemporary character of war. Department and agency participation is voluntary, significant information sharing problems exist, and interagency representatives lack decisionmaking authority. 68 Even if these problems were adequately addressed, the military would continue to dictate the discourse. 69 A civilian-led regional headquarters will facilitate the elusive whole of government approach Combatant Commanders seek today. It innately will include the key competencies for successful conflict termination: early and continuous interagency planning, development of achievable objectives and end states, and unity of effort. 74 A regional interagency headquarters will provide the structure necessary to develop feasible, acceptable, and suitable solutions to the nation's foreign policy problems.
Moreover, it provides a framework for the integration and synchronization of all elements of national power that will increase effectiveness and efficiency in United
States foreign policy implementation through the fog generated by the character of modern war. The world is a much different place than it was just 60 years ago. The notion that today's strategic environment is significantly more complex than that of the past stems from a lack of appreciation for the character of twenty-first century warfare,
